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Abstract
The aim of my paper is to analyze the debate between Mencius and Xunzi from the 
perspective of their views on the nature of the historical process. The Mencian approach 
embraces not only elaboration on the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, resulting in 
a cyclical vision of history, but also strong idealization of the past. I will show that ren 
(benevolence), treated as a historical principle, could link two dimensions of his historical 
thinking: the moral and ontological. Xunzi rejected the possibility of the intervention of 
Heaven in history, however, his theory of rituals and belief in moral use of history made 
his philosophy of history much more conservative, embalming the idealization of the past. 
In short, I will look for the main common points and differences between these two major 
figures of Confucianism regarding their views on history, attempting to answer which 
beliefs could constitute a unique Confucian philosophy of history.
Keywords: Confucianism, Mencius, Xunzi, philosophy of history, Mandate of Heaven, 
idealization
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Izvleček 
Osrednji namen prispevka je analiza debat med Mencijem in Xunzijem z upoštevanjem 
njunih stališč o naravi zgodovinskega procesa. Mencijevo izhodišče ni opredeljeno zgolj 
z nadgradnjo doktrine Nebeškega mandata, katere rezultat je ciklično dojemanje zgodo-
vine, temveč tudi z intenzivno idealizacijo preteklosti. Avtor pokaže, da lahko koncept 
ren v vlogi zgodovinskega principa poveže obe osrednji dimenziji njegove historiografske 
miselnosti: moralno in ontološko. Xunzi pa je možnost poseganja Neba v zgodovino zani-
kal, četudi je njegova teorija zgodovinopisja zaradi teorije obrednosti in moralne funkcije 
zgodovine, ki prav tako zaobjema idealizacijo preteklosti, veliko bolj konservativna od 
Mencijeve. Avtor se osredotoči na osrednje razlike med obema historiografskima teorija-
ma, da bi si odgovoril na vprašanje, katera je bila pomembnejša za specifično konfucijan-
sko filozofijo zgodovine. 
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Introduction
Two major figures of early Confucianism––Mencius and Xunzi––have been the 
subject of numerous comparisons, most of which started from elucidation of their 
views on human nature (Soles 2008) and then analyzed their concepts of vir-
tue ( Jiyuan 2005; Nivison and van Norden 1996), moral feelings (Lodén 2009; 
Chong 2003), ritual (Kim 2011, 2012) or politics (Twiss and Chan 2012; Kim 
2016). However, I have not found a paper devoted to an analysis of their views on 
history, despite the fact both Mencius and Xunzi created intriguing philosophies 
of history. The aim of this paper is thus to fill this gap and explicate their concepts 
of the historical process. Of course, both Mencius and Xunzi did not perceive 
reflection on history as an independent discipline, different from other fields of 
philosophical inquiry. However, this should not be an obstacle, since it also con-
cerns their ethics and political philosophy. We therefore have to read Mengzi and 
Xunzi once again, but from the perspective of their modes of historical think-
ing, as this would help to us see a rather ignored yet impressive literature on a 
Confucian philosophy of history. In order to avoid laying out Western (especially 
Hegelian) ways of understanding the task of a philosophy of history, we will fol-
low the proven path of extensional definition, and so determine (by enumerating 
exemplars) which type of questions are posed by philosophers of history, and then 
examine these on the basis of works of Mencius and Xunzi.
Let me specify some of the questions forming part of the subject of interest of 
the philosophy of history in its classical sense.1 First of all, it is an idea about the 
rational order of the historical process, making it something more than a mere 
sequence of events, e.g. whether history is linear or cyclical or a combination of 
those two modes, or something else. After we have determined the shape of the 
historical process we could ask about its direction: typically, progress or idealiza-
tion of the past (or eternal return, and so on.). We can then suppose that this order 
is embodied in God, Weltgeist, Heaven or Dao, manifesting itself in the history. 
If we do not believe in such an extraordinary supervisor then we are still philoso-
phers of history, what is often not fully acknowledged by critics of the philosophy 
of history. Furthermore, we have to answer whether there are historical “heroes”, 
or prominent individuals who were given certain special historical missions (or 
not). Some answers exclude others. For instance, if we believe in the Absolute 
manifesting in history, giving a sort of historical mission to emperors or prophets, 
we could hardly maintain that nature or economics constitute an ultimate basis of 
1 Arthur Danto distinguished substantial and analytical philosophies of history (Danto 1968). The 
way I understand “classical” philosophy of history is thus similar to his notion of a “substantial” 
philosophy of history, albeit Chinese philosophy was in close contact with historiography.
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all historical changes. This choice is widely known as that between historical ide-
alism and materialism. But we have still not even touched on another key problem 
of the philosophy of history, that is how the past influence the present and how 
it is connected with the future. One of the possible connections between these 
three times is a moral one (e.g. historia magistra vitae). That implies a particular 
attitude towards historiography and myths of beginning. To simplify work on as 
comparative history of historical thinking, some theorists propose ready-made 
matrixes of notions, e.g. Jörn Rüsen offers whole list of Chinese correlatives for 
such Western terms like memory, sense, history, tradition, evolution, progress, col-
lapse and revolution (Rüsen et al. 2015, 108–9). Instead of proposing such a table, 
we will carefully analyze the text, focusing not only on the terms, but also on the 
whole emplotment (Hayden White’s term) and the context of the delineation of 
certain concepts.
Without doubt, these investigations will be helpful not only for historians and 
philosophers, but also for scholars in Chinese studies, shedding a new light on the 
similarities and differences between these two thinkers, and hopefully helping us 
leave behind some inadequate interpretations, notably in the case of Xunzi. For 
instance, Q.E. Wang writes that “Xunzi hinted at the idea of progress or evolu-
tion in history” (Ng and Wang 2005, 49). We will see that such a superposition 
of Xunzi with the Legalists is far from accurate, and, not without effort, we can 
describe the Confucian philosophy of history as a coherent unit, different from its 
Legalist, Mohist and Daoist counterparts. 
To Follow the Shadow of the Sages: Mengzi’s Idealization of the Past 
One of the most striking features of Mengzi’s philosophy (and his literary style) 
is the idealization of the past, particularly (but not only) the times of great found-
ers of dynasties: Zhou Wenwang (1152–1056 BCE), the founder of the Zhou 
Dynasty,2 Cheng Tang (c. 1675–1646 BCE), the founder of the Shang dynasty 
and, even before, the times of the legendary emperors Yao (c. 2356–2255 BCE) 
and Shun (c. 2294–2184 BCE), the first human rulers “under Heaven”. Idealiza-
tion means, firstly, that the behavior, words, decisions, and so on of these rulers 
followed and perfectly applied (Confucian) moral norms. As such, their actions 
differ significantly from those seen in the Mencian era. They are ideal not because 
their patterns of conduct could not be achieved, but because such conduct should 
2 Although Zhou Wenwang received a lot of esteem from Confucians, it was his son, King Wu of 
Zhou who finally overthrew the Shangs. Mencius referred to his figure as well, cf. M VIIA, 30 or 
VIIB, 79. 
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be followed by all people in all times: “Shun was a man and I am also a man. But 
Shun became an example to all people in the kingdom and his conduct is worthy 
to be transmitted to later generations.”3 It is said, for instance, that Zhou Wen-
wang governed with benevolent action,4 looked on the people as on a man who 
was wounded5 and shared his pleasures with the people.6 It is also claimed that 
whole world put their faith in Tang.7 As far as Yao and Shun are concerned, we 
can find even clearer examples: Shun completely fulfilled the duties of what con-
stitutes filial piety8 and, moreover, the same “great Shun had a great delight in re-
garding virtue as the common property of the people”.9 This example credits Shun 
with some sort of moral theory, and one that is notably close to Mencian ethics. 
In fact, we can find that the moral theory of Mencius was projected back onto the 
times of Yao and Shun, and this is the second sense of the idealization of the past 
in his philosophy: modelling the past in compliance with certain philosophical 
principles. Let us consider the following statement: “Mencius explained to him 
that man’s nature is good, always making laudatory reference to Yao and Shun”.10 
Here we have not only an act of attribution with regard to the purely Mencian 
doctrine of human nature, but also an explicit mention of Mencius himself (prob-
ably made by one of his disciples editing the work), which shows that Yao and 
Shun served as important stylistic figures. In other words, in order to justify his 
concepts, Mencius put his own beliefs into the mouths of Yao and Shun: “I do not 
dare to set forth before the king anything but the ways of Yao and Shun”.11 In the 
same way, Mencius tried to authenticate his political theory: after delineation of 
the politics of Yao and Shun, he wrote: “one who does not serve his sovereign like 
Shun served Yao, does not respect his sovereign”. Such a commandment has the 
force of rhetorical emphasis, or even a formal tool: “do it, because Yao and Shun 
did it”. The figures of Yao and Shun were also invoked in order to promote con-
crete political solutions, e.g. M VI B, 30 vis-à-vis the ideal tax system.
3 舜人也, 我亦人也。舜為法於天下, 可傳於後世; M IVB, 56. “M” will denote Mengzi. “A” and “B” 
refer to “上” and “下” characters in the titles of respective chapters. In matters of paragraph divi-
sions, I am following Chinese Text Project edition (see: References). All quotes without a translator 
mentioned have been translated by the author.
4 文王發政施仁; M IIB, 12.
5 M IVB, 48.
6 M IIB, 11.
7 天下信之; M IB, 18.
8 M IVA, 28.
9 大舜有大焉, 善與人同; M IIA, 8.
10 孟子道性善, 言必稱堯舜; M IIIA, 1.
11 我非堯舜之道, 不敢以陳於王前; M IIB, 11.
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It has to be stressed, however, that such a tool was not Mengzi’s invention, and 
there are numerous references to Yao and Sun in the Confucian Dialogues.12 In-
terestingly enough, Mencius made a significant criticism of the Mohist Yizhi 夷
之 in this regard, who referred to the ways of the ancients in order to justify the 
doctrine of universal love.13 Zhuangzi also used this rhetorical tool, referring to 
the figures of Yao and Shun in order to attack Confucian values.14 We can thus see 
that Yao and Shun were common vehicles for expressing one’s own beliefs in the 
Warring Sates period, mostly owing to Confucianism.
Nonetheless, one can claim that so far we have analyzed nothing but Mengzi’s at-
titude towards great emperors. Even if idealized, supposing such views still broadly 
agree with their historical records, this does not propose any independent philoso-
phy of history that would not be rooted in general, historiographical views of their 
reigns. Indeed, Mencius stressed the necessity of learning histories, as follows:
When a scholar feels that his friendship with all the virtuous scholars 
of the kingdom is not sufficient to satisfy him, he proceeds to ascend to 
consider the men of antiquity. He repeats their poems, and reads their 
books, and as he does not know what they were as men, to ascertain this, 
he considers their history.15
But even a superficial review of the ancient Chinese chronicles does not allow us 
to share Mengzi’s optimism on this point, as kings often killed and betrayed the 
allies. What should we do when faced with such a contradiction? Mengzi’s answer 
is: so much the worse for the facts. “Mencius said, ‘It would be better to be without 
the Book of History than to give entire credit to it. In the ‘Completion of the War’, 
I select two or three passages only, which I believe.”16
With this statement, disputing the reliability of a work which finally became the 
part of Confucian Classics (五經, Wujing), Mencius gave priority to his own phi-
losophy, making it a starting point of much reflection on history. It does not mean 
that he totally rejected Shangshu as a source of historical knowledge (he quotes 
it from time to time, cf. M IVA, 8), but the way he used this (and any other) his-
torical source was highly selective. We could say that this attitude constitutes the 
third meaning of the notion of the idealization of the past: the more we idealize a 
story, the more we wander from the account of “what really happened”. 
12 Lunyu VI, 30; VIII, 19–20; XII, 22; XIV, 42; XV, 5.
13 M IIIA, 5.
14 Zhuangzi I, 4; II, 10; XII, 6; XIII, 5; XXII, 4; XXIII, 2; XXIV, 5.12.
15 M VB, 17. J. Legge’s translation.
16 M VIIB, 49. J. Legge’s translation.
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Apart from references to particular rulers, Mencius discussed former kings and 
the ancients in general, which should finally dispel any doubts that his reflections 
in this context depend on previous histories. This shows that he was not interested 
in praising singular individuals, but all rulers and all people of ancient times, and 
thus his idealization of the past was very broad. None of the actions of the so-
called former kings (先王, xianwang) are described as wild or lost.17 Their hearts 
are full of compassion for the people, and their politics follow this attitude.18 Vir-
tuous monarchs of antiquity loved virtue and therefore forgot about the immoral 
use of their political power.19 And although Mencius wrote that the influence of 
junzi ends in the fifth generation,20 this did not prevent him from stating that the 
principles of both earlier and later kings were the same.21 This idea is thus the key 
bone of contention between Mencius and Xunzi in the context of this study. 
As we have already said, Mencius used not only the notion of former kings, but 
also the term 古之人 guzhiren, “the people of antiquity”. It is explicitly claimed 
that the ancients surpassed other men because they did nothing but that which 
was good.22 They raised their children in the same manner, but were not attached 
to their own vested interests: “the ancients exchanged sons, and one taught the 
son of another”.23 Although they sought high offices, none of these men wanted to 
fulfill obligations in an improper way,24 and so there was peace in the whole king-
dom (cf. M VIIB, 54). Their moral conduct stemmed from systematic effort and 
self-restraint, while also accompanied by common pleasures25 and full of utility: “if 
you make half of the achievements that have been done by the ancients, you will 
be surely accompanied by success”.26 The unity of deontological, hedonistic and 
utilitarian aspects that is proposed depicts the ancients as a pure ideal of conduct, 
making them (especially former kings and founders of dynasties) exemplars to be 
followed by all following ages. People who repeat that “born in this age, we should 
be of this age” have the moral standards of eunuchs.27 This unity shows also that 
three kinds of idealization (distinguished, at a first glance, quite artificially) are 
17 M IB, 11.
18 先王有不忍人之心, 斯有不忍人之政矣; M IIA, 6.
19 古之賢王好善而忘勢; M VIIA, 8.
20 M IVB, 50.
21 先聖後聖, 其揆一也; M IVB, 29.
22 古之人所以大過人者無他焉, 善推其所為而已矣; M IA, 7.
23 M IV A, 18.
24 古之人未嘗不欲仕也, 又惡不由其道; M IIIB, 8.
25 古之人與民偕樂; M IA, 1.
26 故事半古之人, 功必倍之; M IIA, 1.
27 生斯世也, 為斯世也, 善斯可矣。閹然媚於世也者; M VIIB, 83.
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one and the same way of thinking: we have to read chronicles (third kind) as a 
manual of proper conduct (second kind), embodied in the figures of the ancients 
(first kind).
The Shadow High as Heaven: Mengzi’s Metaphysics of History
The moral use of the past is not what the whole Mencius consists of. In the field of 
the philosophy of history, apart from its ethical dimension, we also have to eluci-
date ontological concepts of history, which seems to be quite opposite to what we 
have already described. What I am thinking of is Mengzi’s theory of Heaven (天, 
Tian) and its impact on human history, particularly the doctrine of the Mandate 
of Heaven (天命, Tianming). Mencius is convinced that only by receiving the fa-
vor of Heaven can one achieve significant results with any endeavor.28 There is no 
way, for example, to besiege a city, if Heaven did not send down the right moment 
for doing so.29 Accordingly, not being equal to the task that Heaven has placed be-
fore us at a particular time and place, results in disasters that Heaven visits on us.30 
Heaven cares for those who obey its commands: it preserves their countries and 
helps them conquer what is under Heaven.31 Those who rebel against the will of 
Heaven, will surely pass away.32 Mohist imputations of fatalism to Confucians are, 
therefore, to some extent valid. Although Mencius agreed with his Master that 
Heaven does not speak, but only manifests its will through the course of events,33 
he credited Heaven with features making it responsible for all events happening 
objectively, mostly those unexplained rationally. In M VA, 6 he provides specific 
criterion, allowing us to see which actions are caused by Heaven: 
(1) What man cannot make, comes from Heaven; 
(2) That which does not have the perpetrator, comes from Heaven; 
(3) That which does not have (recognized) cause and purpose, comes from the 
command of Heaven.34 
As we can see, the triple criterion could also include natural disasters and seem-
ingly random factors enabling the seizure of power: the right time, a favorable 
combination of events or the right people encountered on the road of life. In this 
28 若夫成功, 則天也; M IIB, 21.
29 夫環而攻之, 必有得天時者矣; M IIA, 10.
30 不取, 必有天殃; M IB, 17.
31 樂天者保天下, 畏天者保其國; M IB, 10.
32 順天者存, 逆天者亡; M IVA, 7.
33 天不言以行與事示之而已矣; M VA, 5.
34 皆天也, 非人之所能為也。莫之為而為者, 天也；莫之致而至者, 命也.
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respect, the Mencian concept of Heaven ties in with the basic sense of the term 
“providence” in Western culture. Whereas Europeans talk about the “providential 
man”, Mencius introduces the figure of the “minister of Heaven” (天吏 Tianli, cf. 
M IIA, 5 or IIB, 7). What we mean here is only a structural counterpart, and not 
the meaning itself: both terms have meaning in relation to other terms, which are 
strictly different, especially regarding the attitude towards Transcendence. 
Notwithstanding this, it is only one side of the Mencian theory of Tian. The other 
is that one has to receive any gift of Heaven in humility, because what is sent by 
Heaven comes naturally. Heaven’s gift is thus the culmination of the way than a 
ready solution (deus ex machina): “When Heaven is about to confer a great office 
on any man, it first exercises his mind with suffering, and his sinews and bones 
with toil. It exposes his body to hunger, and subjects him to extreme poverty.”35 
 It is thus sometimes necessary to wait hundreds of years, until the desired, out-
standing individual called by Heaven will reveal himself.36 Only a person who 
faithfully serves Heaven is able to overcome all these difficulties.37 He is also able 
to overthrow all his opponents, with the result that there are no enemies through-
out the state.38 This is the reason why not a few scholars claim that Mencius’ the-
ory of Heaven is nothing but a theory of the legitimization of power. On the one 
hand, in contrast to Legalists, it is also the theory of moral legitimacy: Mencius 
does not see any possibility for political takeover made by murderer basing solely 
on Realpolitik. If someone came to power and established a new dynasty then he 
was able to do so because it was the will of Heaven, which had previously tested 
him. On the other hand, Mencius never answered what kind of being Tian exactly 
is. He does not provide a clear explanation, because he defines Heaven through 
its functions (“creates”, “rewards”, “listens to”, etc.), and not by predicates (Zeng 
2013). A famous statement made by Robert Eno seems to be rooted in a sim-
ilar remark, summarized as follows: Confucianism is not “about” Tian, and the 
concept of Heaven serves as a “rhetorical anchor” for other kind of beliefs (Eno 
1990, 5). El Amine is not so radical in denying ontological considerations at all, 
but still argues that the political theory centered on the idea of Heaven was inde-
pendent from any metaphysics of Tian (El Amine 2015, 178). If ontological re-
flection on the nature of Heaven (or rather the lack of it) is irrelevant for political 
philosophy, it should thus not be a primary subject of our main concern, which is 
an interpretation of the philosophy of history. The Mandate of Heaven results in 
35 M VIB, 35. J. Legge’s translation. 
36 M IIB, 22.
37 為天吏, 則可以伐之; M IIB, 7. Here we have the same Tianli that means “minister of Heaven”.
38 無敵於天下者使也; M IIA, 5.
Azijske_studije_2017_1_FINAL.indd   154 30.1.2017   14:01:11
155Asian Studies V (XXI), 1 (2017), pp. 147–171
the founding of new dynasties (and the fall of the old), along with the raising up 
of eminent individuals, i.e. historical heroes, and thus Tian intervenes in history, 
no matter what Tian is. 
Interpretations arguing that Tian was used in order to legitimize political power 
at the same time reverse (in a critical manner) the view of Mengzi himself: only 
moral individuals can receive the Mandate of Heaven, and history is full of such 
examples. In a long dialogue with Wan Zhang, Mencius explained how the sages 
had received their thrones, and he noticed that, on closer examination, nobody 
had given another person the throne:
The sovereign can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven 
give that man the throne (…) Yao presented Shun to Heaven, and Heav-
en accepted him. He presented him to the people, and the people accept-
ed him (…) When Heaven gave the kingdom to the worthiest, it was 
given to the worthiest. When Heaven gave it to the son of the preceding 
sovereign, it was given to him. Shun presented Yu to Heaven (…) In 
the case of a private individual obtaining the throne, there must be in 
him virtue equal to that of Shun or Yu; and moreover there must be the 
presenting of him to Heaven by the preceding sovereign. It was on this 
account that Confucius did not obtain the throne. When the kingdom is 
possessed by natural succession, the sovereign who is displaced by Heav-
en must be like Jie or Zhou (…) Confucius said, “Tang and Yu resigned 
the throne to their worthy ministers. The sovereign of Xia and those of 
Yin and Zhou transmitted it to their sons. The principle of righteousness 
was the same in all the cases.”39
Ren as the Principle of Historical Cycles
This passage from M VA, 5–6 provides us with explicit elucidation of the Men-
cian philosophy of history. What is more, it shows a connection between two 
dimensions of his historical thinking which seem to be separate: on the one hand, 
idealization and moral use of the past, and on the other, a quasi-ontological theory 
of Heaven being a historical agent. Throughout all of (Chinese) history, successors 
were proposed by current rulers because of the virtue of candidates, then accepted 
and appointed by Heaven and finally accepted by the people (in consonance with 
the principle of 民本 minben). “The principle of righteousness was the same in all 
39 M VA, 5–6. J. Legge’s translation.
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the cases”, a general rule of historical change from the legendary emperors until 
the Zhou dynasty. As appointed by Tian, these historical heroes (especially the 
founders of dynasties) could serve as moral examples for the following genera-
tions: this is what I mean by unity of two dimensions. Counterexamples of cruel 
rulers or righteous people who did not obtain the throne (like Confucius) do not 
falsify Mencius’ thesis: they only show that one of the conditions was not fulfilled, 
e.g. Confucius was not presented as a candidate, and tyrants were not accepted by 
Heaven.
We can go further and ask which principle makes king a king, a person who 
changes the course of history. Mencius’ answer is: benevolence (仁 ren). “The wor-
thiest” were not full of any kind of virtue or virtue in every meaning of this word 
(cf. the notion of 德 de in Daoism), but instead were worthy because of ren. All 
those who conquer the world can be called benevolent.40 This statement is found 
amid a few sentences describing how Yao, Shun and Yu ordered the world and 
made Middle Kingdom so different from barbarian countries. In M VIIB, 12 
this is made even more explicit: “there are instances of individuals without be-
nevolence, who possessed a single state, but there has been no instance of one 
who got the world without benevolence”.41 What Mencius aims to say here is 
that the past should be followed not because it is a past, but rather because it was 
benevolent. However, only some of the past is good, based on the supposed fact 
that everything the founders of dynasties and great emperors did was good, one 
has to be aware of the other side. In order words: antiquity alone is not a pattern 
of conduct, and thus the Mencian idealization of the past is not naïve; ren alone 
is not sufficient to have historical influence, as one must also be compliant with 
ancient laws:
The principles of Yao and Shun, without a benevolent government, could 
not secure the tranquil order of the kingdom. There are now princes who 
have benevolent hearts and a reputation for benevolence, while yet the 
people do not receive any benefits from them, nor will they leave any ex-
ample to future ages––all because they do not put into practice the ways 
of the ancient kings. Hence we have the saying: “Virtue alone is not suf-
ficient for the exercise of government; laws alone cannot carry themselves 
into practice”. It is said in the Book of Poetry, “Without transgression, 
without forgetfulness, Following the ancient statutes.” Never has any one 
fallen into error, who followed the laws of the ancient kings.42
40 為天下得人者謂之仁; M IIIA, 4.
41 不仁而得國者, 有之矣；不仁而得天下, 未之有也.
42 M IVA, 1. J. Legge’s translation.
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We could even say that for Mencius ren is the principle of history: if the conduct of 
the ancients was benevolent, they were respected by Heaven and hence able to do 
what seems beyond human power and change the history of the world. But if ren 
is a principle of history then this statement has two implications: the first is that it 
remains the same throughout history, but the second is that it has to change things––
there is no “history” without a change. The question thus arises: what is to be changed?
The change is determined by the difference, and this is also true in this case: rulers 
are benevolent or not. The possession or lack of benevolence has historical impact: 
“it was by benevolence that the Three Dynasties gained the throne, and by not 
being benevolent that they lost it”.43 As we can see, the Mandate of Heaven is not 
mentioned here––rulers owe it to themselves to bring their dynasties to collapse. 
On a large scale this concerns whole dynasties, as the Three Dynasties mentioned 
are of course the Xia, the Shang and the Zhou, covering the whole of Chinese 
history before Mencius. Cyclical “transformations of ren” are therefore identical 
with dynastic cycles. In this way Mencius laid the foundations for this influential 
idea, developed later by Dong Zhongshu by mixture of Confucianism and yin-
yang school. In M VIIB, 37, in the last remaining passage of Book of Mencius, the 
Chinese philosopher determined the length of each cycle, estimating it for 500 
years. However, in order to massage his calculations he treated Confucius as a king 
(without a crown), which means that his contemporaries would have had to wait 
another four centuries for the end of the cycle.44 
The difference between the beginning and the ending of each cycle is called “pe-
riod of harmony and period of chaos” 一治一亂 yizhi yiluan (M IIIB, 14), in 
just the same phrase as was later used by Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) (Liu 2001, 
198). The other difference has to be made between the principles of the sages 
and morality of Mengzi’s contemporaries. Even in periods of harmony, the moral 
standards of the people were often not––as in the time of Mencius––as high as 
those in the times of Yao and Shun. We thus not only have a cyclical change of 
harmony-ren and chaos-buren, but also a linear and graduating decay of the prin-
ciples, so strongly stressed by idealization of the past:
From Tang to Wu Ding there had appeared six or seven worthy and sage 
sovereigns (…) Then, Zhou was removed from Wu Ding by no great 
43 三代之得天下也以仁, 其失天下也以不仁; M IVA, 3.
44 That is the times of the Eastern Han dynasty, but since the Han dynasty in general was established 
in 206 B.C., Mencius’ figures were quite wrong. His calculations were used by Sima Tan, who in 
Lun liujia yaozhi predicted that a “new Confucius” should write a chronicle for his own times, just 
like Kongzi made Spring and Autumn Annals (Shiji V, 130). In this respect, the new cycle began 
with Sima Qian.
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interval of time (…) There were still remaining some of the ancient fam-
ilies and of the old manners (…) The present time is one in which the 
royal dignity may be easily attained. In the flourishing periods of the Xia, 
Yin, and Zhou dynasties, the royal domain did not exceed a thousand li 
(…) never was there a time when the sufferings of the people from tyran-
nical government were more intense than the present.45
From times of Yao and Shun, and the times of Zhou Wenwang, there were periods 
with “several” good kings and when “something remained” from the old customs 
of the Zhou, up to the times when tyrants were governing their countries, and the 
one kingdom of Zhou had been divided into separate and warring states. In fact, 
this is not only an interpretation that we use in order to connect a more cyclical 
approach with the linear view of gradual collapse (after already having linked the 
moral use of the past with reflection on the historical role of Heaven). Mencius 
himself gives such an account, as follows:
After the death of Yao and Shun, the principles that mark sages fell into 
decay. Oppressive sovereigns arose one after another, who pulled down 
houses to make ponds and lakes, so that the people knew not where they 
could rest in quiet (…) By the time of the tyrant Zhou 紂,46 the kingdom 
was again in a state of great confusion. Zhou Gong 周公47 assisted king 
Wu, and destroyed Zhou. He smote Yan, and after three years put its sov-
ereign to death (…) Again the world fell into decay, and principles faded 
away. Perverse speakings and oppressive deeds waxed rife again. There 
were instances of ministers who murdered their sovereigns, and of sons 
who murdered their fathers. Confucius was afraid, and made the “Spring 
and Autumn” (…) Once more, sage sovereigns cease to arise, and the 
princes of the States give the reins to their lusts. Unemployed scholars 
indulge in unreasonable discussions. The words of Yang Zhu and Mo Di 
fill the country (…) When benevolence and righteousness are stopped 
up, beasts will be led on to devour men, and men will devour one another. 
I am alarmed by these things, and address myself to the defence of the 
doctrines of the former sages, and to oppose Yang and Mo (…) When 
sages shall rise up again, they will not change my words.48
45 M IIA, 1. J. Legge’s translation.
46 Last ruler of the Shang dynasty.
47 That is Zhou Wenwang.
48 M IIIB, 14. J. Legge’s translation, italics made by the author.
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This passage gives us the most comprehensive exposition of the Mencian phi-
losophy of history, combining an idea of the decay of the ancient principles with 
cycles of arising sages (cf. italics). It also provides us with an important theory of 
why Confucius wrote the Spring and Autumn Annals in order to save some of the 
Zhou principles, just before the next period of chaos. Mencius encapsulated all 
the dimensions of his philosophy of history, including the moral use of the past, 
in this one passage.
Moral Use of History in Xunzi 
The motif of the moral use of the past, known in the Western culture as historia 
magistra vitae, was also an integral part of Classical Chinese (or at least Confu-
cian) culture (Rüsen 2007), and Xunzi was not an exception in this regard: “We 
observe past events that we can take precautions against them. Order, anarchy, 
right and wrong as well can be recognized in them.”49
The abovementioned recognition is not different from education (thus making the 
comparison to magistra vitae possible): “if you have not heard the words inherited 
from the Ancient Kings, you will be unaware of the greatness of learning and in-
quiry”.50 Or, in other words, “knowledge that does not fit with the standards of the 
Ancient Kings, though hard won, is said to be that of a dissolute mind”.51 What is 
more, learning does not refer to a purely intellectual activity. It implies the practice 
of rituals and music in the shape created by the ancient kings (cf. X 20, 4 and X 
20, 13). It means also, if not first of all, that the words and deeds of the ancient 
kings should be present, i.e. repeated, in one’s own life. Junzi is characterized as 
a person who “in conducting his affairs observes the usual customs of the past”.52 
Finally, for someone who, in addition to his own life has to govern other people’s, 
as is this case for politicians, the past should also be a pattern of ideal government. 
In X 5, 3 and X 8, 4 Xunzi uses exactly the same sentence: 後世言惡, 則必稽
焉 (“whenever we of later generations speak about evil, we must always examine 
their cases”), and it appears just after the stories of particular ancient kings. In the 
commentary to Xunzi, John Knoblock aptly noted:
49 觀往事, 以自戒，治亂是非亦可識; X 25, 3. “X” will denote “Xunzi”. I am using Arabic numerals 
for chapters, because the abbreviation “X” could mean “ten” in Roman numerals. For quotations 
I rely on J. Knoblock’s translation: Xunzi (1988, 199), Xunzi (1990, 200), Xunzi (1994), although 
with respect to division I am still following Chinese Text Project, different from the sequence em-
ployed by Knoblock.
50 治亂是非亦可識; X 1, 2.
51 勞知而不律先王, 謂之姦心; X 6, 10.
52 事行則遵傭故; X 9, 26.
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Xunzi shares with most of his contemporaries the belief that history pro-
vides the basis on which any philosophy of government must be based 
(…) Political philosophy, then, is inseparable from the study of history 
and, in Xunzi’s particular view, of ritual principles (…) The model left 
behind by the sages is the starting point for any analysis of the proper 
form and function of the government. (Xunzi 1990, 200: 3) 
The keyword of the last sentence is “model”. Here model means not only some-
thing on which the latter is being modeled, but also a representation which con-
sists of numerous items structured in proper order. It is not a single instance, but 
a set of examples. Thus Xunzi wrote that “to oppose ritual is the same as lacking 
a model”53 and, as a result, “‘well ordered’ refers to ritual and moral principles and 
‘chaotic’ refers to what is contrary to them”.54 And again, not any kind of rituals 
but concrete customs of antiquity, as they are described in the Classics: “the Way 
of the Hundred kings is at one with the sage. Hence, the Way expressed in the 
Odes, Documents, Rituals and Music returns to this oneness”.55 However, rituals are 
not perceived there as an artificial activity, contrasted with benevolence, despite 
the fact that Xunzi actually prefers to link righteousness with rituals (禮義 liyi) 
rather than benevolence, but still an imitation of the model of the ancient kings 
has to be full of benevolence, because their conduct was ren to the utmost extent: 
how much more important, then, are the ways of the Ancient Kings, the 
guiding principles of humanity and justice, and the pattern of life given 
in the Odes, Documents, Rituals, and Music; they certainly contain the 
most important thoughts in the world.56 
The Classics are much more than a handbook or guide:
Learning—where should it begin and where should it end! I say: Its 
proper method is to start with the recitation of the Classics and conclude 
with the reading of the Rituals. Its real purpose is first to create a scholar 
and in the end to create a sage.57
The goal of education is expressed in the most conservative way: one has to read 
and learn nothing but the Classics, giving priority to the Book of Rituals. What is 
53 非禮是無法也; X 2, 10.
54 禮義之謂治, 非禮義之謂亂也; X 3, 7.
55 百王之道一是矣。故詩書禮樂之道歸是矣; X 8, 16.
56 況夫先王之道, 仁義之統, 詩書禮樂之分乎！彼固為天下之大慮也; X 4, 11.
57 X 1, 12. 
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interesting, from the point of view of the individual, is that one has to make pro-
gress in learning: to start from zero, to recite the Classics, and to end with the Book 
of Rituals. But from the perspective of the society, nothing could change the state 
of knowledge: after achieving one’s own purpose, the final result of the process of 
education is still identical to what previous generations had already obtained. We 
have to be mature enough to get the meaning of the Classics, but not to find new 
principles, both for the future as well as for the current needs of the community.
Xunzi states this positively: the model of the sages is the first and last pattern of 
conduct. It guarantees the continuity and maintenance of civilization:
If each dawn begins a new day and each day a man begins anew, then 
how is it that there are states that have lasted s thousand years tranquilly 
through this? I say it is because the state is succored by a trustworthy 
model, itself a thousand years old.58
The biggest danger for the state is to break this continuity: “only when there is 
removal of a dynasty and the creation of new regulations are difficulties engen-
dered”.59 If introducing new laws and customs result in chaos, holding the ancient 
regulations surely implies harmony: in this respect the thought of Xunzi is very 
coherent and depends on the simple principle of the idealization of the past.
Let us now analyze this idealization in more detail. Since one “should model him-
self after the regulations of Shun and Yu”.60 (re-)construction of those regulations 
is a key problem, not for historical research, because Xunzi (just like Mencius) is 
not interested in scrutinizing ancient historical sources (!), but rather for ethics 
and political philosophy. Xunzi upholds the Confucian tradition that Yao did not 
abdicate because of old age or infirmity, but gave the throne to Shun, acting on his 
morality.61 However, when transmitting this story Xunzi does not mention Tian 
at all: it was just Yao’s decision. He was able to do this because “his heart was filled 
with the purest pleasures” (so he was not attached to power) and he found that 
Shun was full of virtue, like he himself, which made him a proper candidate for 
succeeding the first human emperor. Hence, “Yao and Shun were the most expert 
in the whole world at teaching and transforming (the people)”.62 They were heroes 
of the empire:63 they govern so well that in their times robbers did not steal and 
58 X 11,7.
59 X 18, 19.
60 上則法舜禹之制; X 6, 9.
61 X 18, 16–17.
62 堯舜至天下之善教化者也; X 18, 26.
63 堯舜者天下之英也; X 18, 26.
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thieves did not break in.64 Yao and Shun promoted those with moral worth, so 
the world was well ordered.65 They honored the worthy in order to teach them.66 
Without initiating wars, they submitted other tribes.67 They were loyal and hon-
est,68 returned good for good:
Such was the Way of Ancient Kings, and such is the foundation of the unity 
of mankind. It is the natural response of treating well what is good and of 
despising what is evil, out of which the principles of government necessarily 
grow and concerning which both antiquity and today are in total accord.69
This passage stresses that the rule of the ancient kings was not only benevolent, loy-
al, generous and so on, but also just: “Yu and Tang founded their conduct on mo-
rality and justice”.70 With this explication of the ideal of ancient kings, Xunzi tries 
to express his own vision of making politics. For instance, while praising the system 
of the Qin state (which was, incidentally much more just than benevolent), he ends 
each sentence with the proclamation: “just as were x of antiquity”.71 As we can see, 
Xunzi “uses the past” in very different ways. Some of them are purely rhetorical, e.g. 
in the sentence which states that even Yao and Shun could not have added more.72 
For this reason, Antonio Cua distinguished five kinds of use of the past in Xunzi: 
pedagogical, rhetorical, elucidative and evaluative (Cua 2005, 73–98).
The Shadow of the Later Kings: Broken Unity of History
The distinctive feature of Xunzi’s idealization of the past is his effort to show that 
sages and ancient kings, albeit magnificent, were still people of the same nature as 
their subordinates, and thus like us:
All men possess one and the same nature (…) It is the same in the case 
of a Yu and in that of a Jie (…) Yao and Yu were not born wholly what 
64 X 18, 28.
65 X 25, 2.
66 X 28, 3. 
67 X 25, 2.
68 X 32, 1.
69 X 16, 4.
70 古者禹湯本義務信而天下治; X 16, 10.
71 X 16, 8. He repeats this four times, substituting into x: the people, the officers, the knights and the 
court. 
72 X 9, 25.
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they became, but rose up by transforming their old selves, brought them 
to perfection through cultivation and conscious exertion, and only after 
first putting forth the utmost effort did they become complete.73
Ancient kings are not an unapproachable ideal: everyone could and should follow 
them, and this is possible because they already transformed their original nature 
in the same way as everyone ought to:
The man in the street can become a Yu (塗之人可以為禹), since it is 
possible for every man to understand the substance of humaneness, mo-
rality, the model of law, and rectitude (皆有可以知仁義法正).74 
If kings are primarily “common people”, and the latter are also able to follow the 
path of the sage kings, then the appearance of eminent individuals in history is 
normal and regular, and one does not need to appeal to Heaven in order to explain 
their existence. Even without divine intervention, it is “statistically” certain that 
some of the people will follow the model: “In every generation there have been75 
individuals who were the proper man. If born in the present age, such a proper 
man would fix his mind on the way of the Ancients.”
This does not necessarily mean that people following the sages have the status of 
sages: they could simply follow their conduct in the belief that they have to do so, 
although it is hard to fully realize their principles or some of their regulations are diffi-
cult to understand. The ancient principles are present today first and foremost because 
they have been transmitted from father to son. This partially explains why Xunzi so 
stresses the role of education: because it has historical, and hence also political, impact:
The reason that the model of the Three Dynasties still exists even though 
they have perished is that officers and bureaucrats have meticulously ob-
served the rules and laws, the weights and measures, criminal sanctions 
and penalties, and maps and registers. This has been accomplished even 
when they no longer understood the meaning because they conscien-
tiously safeguarded the calculations and out of prudence never presumed 
either to increase or diminish them. Rather, they handed them from fa-
ther to son in order to aid the king or duke.76
73 X 4, 10.
74 X 23, 20.
75 彼或蓄積而得之者不世絕。彼其人者, 生乎今之世, 而志乎古之道; X 12, 5. Literally: “none of 
the generations is an exception” (不世絕). 
76 X 4, 8.
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This kind of reflection leads Xunzi to the fundamental statement about the uni-
ty of history––past and present are not separate dimensions, guided by different 
principles: “the beginnings of Heaven and Earth are still present today. And the 
way of all True Kings is in that of the Later Kings”.77 As a result, Xunzi criticizes 
those who claim that it is impossible to follow rules of the past in present times: 
“fools say: the circumstances of the past and the present are quite different, and 
the Way by which to bring order to the anarchy of today must be different”.78 
Those words should have a galvanizing effect on those who have tendency to clas-
sify Xunzi as proto-, semi- or krypto-Legalist: they stand in stark contrast with 
remarks of Gongsun Yang. In Book of Lord Shang (商君書 Shangjunshu) we can 
read that if sage “were to imitate antiquity, he would be behind the times (法古則
後於時)” and that is the reason why “the Zhou dynasty did not imitate the Shang 
dynasty, nor did the Xia dynasty imitate the period of Yu” (chapter 7, Shang and 
Duyvendak 2011, 117). Xunzi does not agree with the premise, i.e. that the Three 
Dynasties followed different principles, and thus largely denies the “category mis-
take” of being behind the current times:
The sage uses men to measure men, circumstances to gauge circumstanc-
es, each class of thing to measure that class, the persuasion to measure 
the achievement, and the Way to observe the totality, so that for him the 
ancient and modern are one and the same (以道觀盡, 古今一也). Things 
of the same class do not become contradictory even though a long time 
has elapsed because they share an identical principle of order (類不悖, 
雖久同理).79
Because different epochs share the same principles and can be further used as 
a gauge of proper conduct, they also provide us with negative criterion: every 
doctrine that is neither consistent with ancient kings nor in accord with the re-
quirements of ritual and moral principles is properly described as a treacherous 
doctrine.80 On the other hand, theories which were not created by ancient kings 
but are falsely attributed to them and called “ancient”, are pernicious as well, just 
like theory of Five Phases (五行), pretending to be ancient.81 
But Xunzi is not naïve, and he sees the difference between the ancient times and 
his own, on the epistemological rather than ontological and ethical levels. Despite 
77 天地始者, 今日是也。百王之道, 後王是也; X 3, 10.
78 夫妄人曰: 古今異情, 其所以治亂者異道; X 5, 7.
79 X 5, 7.
80 凡言不合先王, 不順禮義, 謂之姦言; X 5, 8.
81 X 6, 7.
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the unity of principles (ethics) and belonging to one category of events (ontology), 
the third subject of comparison, that is knowledge of the past, is not the same in 
both cases: the ancients knew more of their times than we know about them now, 
and this is obvious. Moreover, the more ancient the times, the less we know about 
them: “for Yu and Tang there are traditions concerning their government, but they 
cannot be ascertained with the detail of those for the Zhou dynasty”.82 This does 
not mean that Xunzi looks for historical truth (“what really happened”), different 
from moral principles, because––let me put it in this way––moral truth is what re-
ally happened: “that before the Five Ancestors there are no traditions concerning 
individuals is not because of the absence of sages during that time, but because of 
the extreme antiquity of the period”.83 The blurred and almost inaccessible truth 
here is that the model of the sages (a particular set of values) had been existing 
even before the first such sages were mentioned. The epistemological difference 
between former and later kings does not make Xunzi suspect that we know very 
little about ancient principles: the moral unity of history is the indisputable truth 
(or dogma). It is so even though we do not know why antiquity and our own 
times constitute one totality.84 The distinction between former and later kings has 
normative implications: since the principles of early and late antiquity are iden-
tical, but those of late antiquity are more accessible for us, we should follow the 
principles of later kings: 
Hence I say: If you want to observe the footprints of the sage kings, you 
must look where they are most clearly preserved––that is, with the Later 
Kings. These Later Kings were lords over the whole world. To put them 
aside and to discuss instead extreme antiquity is like giving up your own 
lord and serving another.85
From this point of view, Xunzi condemns those philosophers who follow the an-
cient kings only in a fragmentary manner, such as Mencius, who sees no difference 
between our knowledge of the ways of former and later kings.86 One should not 
listen to the doctrines of those philosophical schools which do not follow the 
way of later kings.87 Those following the model of former kings are called vulgar 
Confucians/ru (俗儒 su ru), while those following the model of later kings but 
82 X 5,7.
83 X 5, 7.
84 古今之所一也, 未有知其所由來者也; X 19, 23.
85 X 5, 6.
86 X 6, 7.
87 百家之說不及後王, 則不聽也; X 8, 27.
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not knowing why they should do so are called cultivated ru (雅儒 ya ru), and 
finally there who are great ru (大儒 da ru) are intentionally modeling themselves 
on the later Kings.88 Interestingly enough, in this passage it is said the lesser ru 
give priority to the Book of Songs and so on, and not to the rituals. While learning 
of the Classics is vital for Xunzi, as we have already seen analyzing his concept of 
the moral use of the past and learning histories, it is rituals alone that are placed 
at “the top”. Just like in the case of former/later kings, Xunzi presents his own 
preferences without interrupting the main unity. 
Decay of the Historical Agency of Heaven
However, the biggest difference between Xunzi’s philosophy of history and the 
view of history held by other Confucians, and Mencius in particular, does not lie 
in prioritizing rituals over the Classics, or even later kings over the former ones, 
but rather in the lack of any concept of the Mandate of Heaven (and hence histor-
ical cycles). The seventeenth chapter of Xunzi’s collected works directly elaborates 
on this topic. The idea of Tianming is built upon the variations that the will of 
Heaven undergoes: when ruler is benevolent and follows the way of the ancients, 
Heaven is “tranquil”, while it responds to disruption and inappropriate conduct 
by withdrawal of its Mandate, resulting in civil war, floods, earthquakes, and other 
disasters. Xunzi denies the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven by denying its very 
premise: “the course of Nature is constant: it does not survive because of actions 
of Yao; it does not perish because of the actions of Jie”.89 Regardless of the moral 
or immoral conduct of rulers, Tian has never changed its course and intervened in 
history, in other words: it has never been a historical agent, rather the background 
to all historical actions. Consequently, only people are “history-makers”: “since Yu 
achieved order and Jie brought chaos, order and chaos are not due to Heaven”.90 
In Xunzi’s thought, people are fully responsible for history: if they became sages 
(since Yu and others were originally like men in the street), it is due to their own 
effort. 
If the way of Heaven is constant, it is also understandable and rational: what are 
perceived as miracles or unique events can thus be explained rationally: “these are 
unusual events that occur because of a modification of the relation of Heaven and 
Earth or a transmutation of the Yin and Yang”.91 For such a methodical mind like 
88 X 8, 21.
89 天行有常, 不為堯存, 不為桀亡; X 17,1.
90 禹以治, 桀以亂; 治亂非天也; X 17,6.
91 是天地之變，陰陽之化; X 17, 7.
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that of Xunzi, the rationality of nature implies certain conclusions concerning 
how it is used. As he puts it in his famous poem, “how can obeying Heaven and 
singing in hymn of praise be better than regulating what Heaven has mandated 
and using it?”.92 The contrast between the preexisting and arbitrary Mandate of 
Heaven in classical Confucian thought (from Book of Documents up to Mencius) 
and Xunzi’s rationally recognizable yet useable Mandate of Nature is clear and 
distinct. The question of how to use Nature was therefore very important for his 
philosophy of history. All kings have to be, first of all, as constant in their conduct 
as Heaven, and this is achieved by modeling themselves on Tian and positively 
following the way of the ancients.93 
Secondly, they have to use nature for moral and political purposes, and in this 
respect follow the way of ancient kings. We have to stress that although Xunzi 
refutes the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, he still agrees with the statement 
that sages became sages and played roles in history because they understood de-
crees of Tian. From his viewpoint they successfully employed nature in order to 
prevent chaos. In other words, the ancient kings regulated nature,94 and continued 
those regulations in their own conduct: 
Heaven and Earth have completed their changes, the four seasons have 
come full circle, and everything under the canopy of heaven has begun 
anew. Thus, the Ancient Kings based themselves on this and used it for 
their pattern.95
By “transformation of nature” there is meant not only the natural world, but also 
people’s nature. Sages transform original nature, both their own and that of other 
people; the tools used for transformation of one’s own nature are rituals and moral 
duties, which form a basis for the system of laws and standards––in this way the 
whole system of rituals and laws was created by sages who transformed nature.96 
The sage’s relation to ritual and moral principles is like that of the potter to his 
pots.97 In other words, culture was made by ancient kings by means of transform-
ing nature. The reason for the transformation of human nature was that it was 
originally evil:
92 從天而頌之, 孰與制天命而用之; X 17,15.
93 X 17, 9.
94 X 19, 27.
95 X 19, 28.
96 故聖人化性而起偽, 偽起而生禮義, 禮義生而制法度; 然則禮義法度者, 是聖人之所生也; X 
23, 9.
97 X 23, 8.
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In antiquity the sage kings took man’s nature to be evil, to be inclined 
to prejudice and prone to error, to be perverse and rebellious, and not to 
be upright or orderly. For this reason they invented ritual principles and 
precepts of moral duty.98
Those precepts also embraced music, established to harmonize the people: “an-
cient kings guided the people with ritual and music, and the people became har-
monious and friendly”.99 Later kings established proper names,100 but they have 
been neglected since the last sages passed away.101 As a result, the rituals and prin-
ciples employed by kings indicate the causes of anarchy in the world.102 And this 
is how we revert to the theme of learning from history and idealization of the past.
Conclusion
Without any doubt, both Mencius and Xunzi offered different yet comprehensive 
concepts of history, falling within the ambit of Confucianism. The biggest differ-
ence between their views concerns the way of interpreting Tian and its relation to 
human history. For Mencius, Heaven is a powerful, if not the only, ultimate histori-
cal agent, giving and withdrawing its Mandate and by means of the course of things 
revealing its mysterious will. For Xunzi, Tian is rather a synonym for “nature”, 
constant in its course and understandable in its transformations (not decisions!), 
and in this way employed by sages and “prolonged” in rituals. As such, Xunzi did 
not refute the concept of Tianming, but modified it in such a way that Tian became 
the background of history and not its backroom. The second bone of contention 
is an issue of former and later kings. In fact, Mencius sees no difference between 
the former and later sages (先聖後聖, 其揆一也). All of them realized and applied 
one and the same principle, namely ren. History is only a repetitive process of indi-
viduals respecting or disrespecting benevolence. In this sense, Mengzi’s philosophy 
of history is in the end ahistorical, since it denies any historical change, regarding 
each cycle as reincarnation of the previous period and reducing human agency to 
a passive response to the will of Heaven.103 Xunzi, on the other hand, is fully aware 
of the historicity of history: he made a distinction between xianwang and houwang 
98 X 23, 2.
99 王導之以禮樂, 而民和睦; X 20, 6.
100 後王之成名; X 22, 1.
101 今聖王沒, 名守慢; X 22, 3.
102 先王以禮義表天下之亂; X 27, 12.
103 This approach was later accepted and deepened by Dong Zhongshu, (cf. Ng 2005, 195: 61).
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not because of different principles guiding their lives, but due to limitations of our 
knowledge of the past and practical difficulty of following those who had lived far 
before the last recognized and remembered sage kings. It is intriguing that the sup-
posedly “ahistorical” Mencius insisted on talking about historical cycles, whereas 
Xunzi has no criterion to distinguish them, since Tian acts regularly and all unusual 
events can be explained. Last but not least, we have to mention different prefer-
ences of both thinkers. Although as faithful Confucians they stress the historical 
role of both morality and rituals, one could readily notice that ren plays a central 
role in the Mencian philosophy of history, which has little interest in rituals, while 
Xunzi’s case is the reverse. For the latter, those Confucians who set something 
above the rituals cannot be called “great ru”. This point of debate has its source in 
basic assumptions of those thinkers: benevolence is a response to Heaven’s calling 
(Mencius), and rituals result from the transformation of nature (Xunzi).
If this is so, we can ask what makes their views of history Confucian in the final 
result? First of all, it is the moral use of the past. One has to follow the principles 
of the sages, repeat their rituals and read the Classics: the exact order in which 
these actions should be done thus seems to be an internal dispute. The rationale 
for learning from history is of course the idealization of the past, and in the case of 
both thinkers the Zhou times in particular.104 Both philosophers repeat the same 
structures and legends, both of them put their own beliefs into the mouths of the 
legendary emperors Yao and Shun. As a result, both Mencius and Xunzi were 
proponents of the fundamental unity of the past and present (古今一也), and 
perceived history as history only owing to everlasting principles, guiding kings’ 
conduct from the beginnings up until today (to varying degrees). Those degrees 
made them not only idealize the past, but also criticize the present, creating the 
image of the gradual decline of the principles of the sages. They intended a return 
to this state and not to search for anything new: the issue of whether we should 
return to Yao and Shun or to the later kings105 seems not to be, again, a matter 
of utmost importance. The collapse of the world of the sages and critique of the 
present times make learning from history an urgent and necessary task, while 
the unity of history and idealization of the past makes this mission possible. This 
fundamental view was common and untouched in the thought of Mencius and 
Xunzi, despite all of the differences between them, showing once again that the 
core of Confucianism lies not in metaphysics or epistemology, but in the field of 
ethics. The sub-field of the ethics of history cannot change this principle, which 
was established in the dim and distant past. 
104 Daoists derived their genealogy from Yellow Emperor, Mozi claimed to follow the Xia dynasty and 
Legalists called for searching for new principles, associating with the Qin dynasty. 
105 复後王; X 25,1.
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